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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of humanitarian intervention as a tool of foreign policy in the 
Conservative-led Coalition. The first section of the paper provides historical context and 
assesses the traditional approaches to humanitarian intervention as an instrument of foreign 
policy of Conservative governments since the end of the Cold War. This analytical narrative 
considers the Major Government’s response to the Bosnian War. The second section of the 
paper considers the Conservative-led Coalition’s approach to humanitarian intervention in 
two ways: firstly by an examination of the influence of Blair’s humanitarian intervention and 
secondly, by an evaluation of British involvement in the Libyan revolution of 2011. The third 
and final section of the paper offers an explanatory interpretation of the Conservative-led 
Coalition’s humanitarian intervention. This interpretation is predicated on an English School 
theoretical framework for understanding international relations and, in particular, advances 
the argument that the global worldview of David Cameron, William Hague and their liberal 
Conservative colleagues can be understood as solidarist. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 We are grateful to colleagues for providing feedback on earlier drafts of this work presented at the joint PSA 
Conservatives and Conservatism Specialist Group and Centre for British Politics conference, ‘The 
Conservatives in Coalition: Principles, Policy and Power’ held at the University of Hull from 22nd-23rd June 
2012; the PSA Conservatives and Conservatism Specialist Group panel ‘Points of Departure: Exploring 
Tensions in the Conservative-led Coalition’ at the PSA Annual Conference in City Hall, Cardiff 27th March 
2013; and to the two anonymous referees. Any errors are of course our own.  m.beech@hull.ac.uk  
T.J.Oliver@2007.hull.ac.uk 
 
 
2 
 
 
The practice of humanitarian intervention by liberal states has increased significantly since 
the collapse of the bipolar structure that characterised international relations during the Cold 
War. It has emerged as a central issue in international studies and has therefore been the 
focus of much academic attention and widespread analysis (Wheeler, 2002; Bellamy; 2003; 
Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003; Chandler, 2004; Bellamy, 2008; Daddow, 2009; Peksen, 
2012; Weiss, 2012). Inevitably with such a controversial subject there is disagreement of 
what precisely constitutes humanitarian intervention. For the purpose of this paper the 
definition offered by J.L Holzgrefe seems to us a useful one namely, humanitarian 
intervention pertains to: 
 
...the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at 
preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental rights of 
individuals other than its own citizens, without permission of the state within whose 
territory force is applied. (Holzgrefe, 2003: 18) 
 
British governments - including Conservative governments - have found themselves engaging 
the military instrument as part of humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War era in 
Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone.2  The Conservative Party of today is more open to 
humanitarian intervention than ever before. This is in part due to the Liberal influence in 
contemporary British Conservatism which informs their view of economics, social issues and 
humanitarian intervention (Beech, 2011a). Those driving this change are centred on David 
Cameron, whose leadership of both the party and the Coalition has seen the party move the 
furthest on its road towards this position. Beech states that Cameron’s approach to Britain’s   
foreign policy is ‘…a hybrid of the Liberal and Conservative reading of international 
relations…’ he goes on to state ‘…this hybrid vision is a fusion of both idealist and realist 
assumptions and its practical outworking is the traditional Conservative conception of 
vigorously pursuing Britain’s national interests, but one that is tempered by a Liberal 
commitment to human rights and democracy.’ (Beech, 2011a: 268-269)  Some scholars have 
discussed the foreign policy approach of Cameron’s Conservatives in light of neo-
conservative thought, (Dodds and Elden, 2008); others interpret it as representative of a 
bounded liberal tradition (Daddow and Schnapper, 2013); another suggests that it appears to 
be a form of pluralism (Morris, 2011). We contend that the theoretical framework of the 
English School is a useful means to explain the approach of Cameron’s Conservatives to 
international affairs and their party’s change in attitude towards humanitarian intervention 
suggests a contemporary worldview which emphasises elements of idealism as well as 
realism and a more solidarist perspective than traditional Conservatives. 
 
 Broadly put, all English School scholars share a belief in an international society of states, 
where they act together on issues out of a sense of having common interests (Bull, 2002). 
They seek to make the society both orderly and just, but there is a disagreement among 
                                                          
2 The Gulf War is understood as a UN sanctioned invasion responding to Iraq’s breach of Kuwaiti sovereignty; 
the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan against the Taliban is not regarded as a humanitarian intervention but rather 
a conflict of self-defence and national security; the Iraq War of 2003 is deemed to be neither. 
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English School theorists as to which of these two concerns must come prior to the other. For 
pluralists, order is prior, as this is the mechanism through which the international society is 
preserved, which in turn preserves a plurality of ‘good lives’ in a variety of states (Buzan, 
2004). This is what Dunne calls a ‘thin’ morality – that is, international law and norms are 
created by states, and their only subjects are states (Dunne, 1998). The rules do not permeate 
within the borders of states.  Solidarists stand at the other end of the spectrum – for them, 
morality is ‘thick’ and justice must play at least an equal role in the operation of the 
international society in order for it to survive. Their analytical framework begins from a 
cosmopolitan conception of humankind as one unit, rather than from the pluralists’ positivist 
conception of international society being centred on states. It then works from there, arguing 
that justice and order require laws that can reach inside states to protect the rights of 
individuals, including in cases where those rights are threatened by that same state (Buzan, 
2004). This clearly marks the distinction between the pluralists and solidarists on 
humanitarian intervention, with the solidarist conception of the need for rules to protect 
individuals as well as states making them broadly supportive of such interventions, whilst a 
focus on the need to protect states and therefore a variety of good lives places pluralists in 
opposition to such actions (Wheeler, 2000).  
 
The first section of the paper provides an important historical context and assesses the 
traditional Conservative Party approach to humanitarian intervention as an instrument of 
foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. This analytical narrative focuses on the Major 
Government’s response to the Bosnian War. The second section of the paper considers the 
Conservative-led Coalition’s approach to humanitarian intervention by an examination of the 
influence of Blair’s humanitarian intervention followed by an evaluation of British 
involvement in the Libyan revolution of 2011. The third and final section of the paper offers 
an explanatory interpretation of the Conservative-led Coalition’s humanitarian intervention 
predicated on an English School theoretical framework for understanding international 
relations.  
 
The paper adopts a mixed methodological approach. In the first section an historical approach 
is utilised to provide an analytical narrative of Conservative governments’ response to the 
Bosnian crisis.  The second and third sections rely more heavily on a hermeneutic method 
towards text analysis of speeches by Cameron and Hague; empirical data in the form of elite, 
semi-structured interviews with four former Conservative Foreign Secretaries: Lord 
Carrington, Lord Howe of Aberavon, Lord Hurd of Westwell and Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP3; 
and academic scholarship on the Conservative Party under Cameron and English School 
international relations theory. Whilst there is a growing literature on specific foreign policy 
issues undertaken by the Coalition such as international development (Sharp, Campbell and 
Laurie, 2010; Vickers, 2011; Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012), defence and national security 
                                                          
3 This is the second paper to emerge from the research project which began data collection in late 2009. It was 
the intention to attempt to gain interviewees with all of the Foreign Secretaries who served Thatcher and Major. 
Obviously Lord Pym of Sandy died before the research was undertaken; Sir John Major declined to be 
interviewed; and the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, William Hague MP, though initially interested in being 
interviewed eventually declined in the lead up to the 2010 General Election. 
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(Dover and Phythian, 2011; Martin, 2011; O’Donnell, 2011) and Britain’s relationship with 
Europe (Lynch, 2011; Lynch, 2012; Lynch and Whitaker, 2013) there is relatively little 
scholarship which focuses on how the Conservative Party’s approach to foreign policy has 
evolved in government under Cameron (Beech, 2011b; Vickers, 2011, Honeyman, 2012) and, 
even less, on its approach to humanitarian intervention (Daddow, 2013; Daddow and 
Schnapper, 2013). This article seeks to contribute to the scholarship on the Conservative-led 
Coalition’s foreign policy in general and their approach to humanitarian intervention in 
particular. As mentioned above, our methodological approach is distinctive and this has given 
us access to a rich set of data. In addition, the English School theoretical framework 
employed enables us to explain the Conservative-led Coalition’s approach to humanitarian 
intervention. Specifically, we are able to provide a degree of comparative evaluation between 
contemporary Conservative attitudes and approaches and those of previous Conservative 
Foreign Secretaries and New Labour under Tony Blair. Our findings suggest that whilst there 
are foreign policy continuities with previous Conservative governments, the issue of 
humanitarian intervention marks a significant discontinuity. On this controversial aspect of 
foreign policy the Conservative-led Coalition’s thought and action is decidedly un-
conservative and contra-realist. In fact, their perspective owes more to solidarist idealism. 
Whilst Cameron and Hague are more tempered about Britain’s role in humanitarian 
intervention their worldview has been affected by, and is not altogether different from, 
Blair’s. 
 
Humanitarian Intervention in the post-Cold War era: The Case of Bosnia  
 
The two principal wars fought by Britain between the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 
1989 and the defeat of the Conservative government in the 1997 general election were the 
Gulf War and the Bosnian War. They offered two very different portraits of the Conservative 
Party leading the country in war in this period; though, given the very different character of 
the two wars, this is not altogether surprising. In the former instance, the government was 
very much concerned with one particular aspect of order in the international society – the 
preservation of and independence of an individual state (Bull, 2002). In the latter case, the 
conflict in Bosnia raised questions which are more directly related to the order/justice debate 
that lies at the centre of the disagreement over humanitarian intervention within the English 
School (Buzan, 2004). From this we can draw more specific conclusions that relate to the 
central topic of this paper. 
 
Bosnia presented a radically different problem for the Major government to confront; rather 
than a comparatively simple case of one state invading another, the war revolved around the 
violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the early years of the 1990s. In particular, the multi-ethnic 
state of Bosnia saw the worst fighting as Croats, Serbs and Muslims battled for control of the 
country (Childs, 2012). The question of intervention was therefore loaded with humanitarian 
implications from the very start. In comparison to the relative moral clarity and unity which 
evidenced itself in the response of the Conservative Party to the Gulf War, Bosnia would 
throw light on deep internal divisions within the party on the question of humanitarian 
intervention. The reaction of the Conservative Party to the question of whether to intervene in 
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Bosnia can be broadly described as hostile, though this was by no means a universal response 
to the issue. Hurd’s remarks about the ‘Something Must Be Done Club’ can be seen as 
summarising the position of many Conservatives succinctly (Hindell, 1995); not only 
reluctant to intervene in Bosnia, but actively scornful of those who advocated such a move. 
Such was the intensity of feeling against British intervention in Bosnia that Major began to 
fear for the stability of his government (Auerswald, 2000). The feeling would remain intense 
throughout the campaign, with opponents consistently arguing in the Commons against 
further commitment of British forces.  
 
In Parliament, opponents of the war argued against it on a variety of grounds, the most 
important of which centred on Britain’s national interest. Arguments such as that made by 
Cyril Townshend in relation to the practicalities of air power as a means to end the civil war 
in Bosnia (Hansard, 1995a) were made, but it is argued that they were peripheral to the 
primary concerns of most Conservative MPs. Indeed, they tie back rather well into that 
central concern over Britain’s national interest, in that many of the MPs who raised such 
issues asked whether such ineffective tactics or large-scale deployments would not simply 
leave Britain unable to commit properly elsewhere, should its ‘real’ interests be threatened by 
some other party (Hansard, 1994a).  Nicholas Budgen put this case most explicitly at the time 
of Bosnia both in The Independent (Budgen, 1995) and on that same day in the Commons 
(Hansard, 1995b). For these Conservatives, there were quite simply no British interests at 
stake in Bosnia, and certainly none worth committing any armed forces to defend. This 
conception of Britain’s national interest was shared by Douglas Hurd, who would argue this 
point in his memoirs (Hurd, 2003). Britain’s national interest was therefore defined in what 
might be called a more realist fashion, in line with Conservative foreign policy traditions. 
This supports Keohane’s observations on these traditions – MPs who supported the Gulf War 
could oppose Bosnia, as the upholding of international law mattered only when it coincided 
with Britain’s national interests in other areas (Keohane, 2003). In Bosnia, where there was 
no interest at stake, the legal argument fell aside for these MPs. 
 
Yet, as noted above, this hostility was not a universal position for Conservative 
parliamentarians. There were fervent disagreements within the Major government, including 
around the cabinet table, over the question of intervention in Bosnia. Hurd found himself 
defending the commitments which had already been made against the more strenuous 
opposition of other ministers to British involvement (Hennessey, 2001). This position 
seemingly contradicts the one he took in his memoir, yet Hurd’s defence of British military 
commitments after they had been made fits with traditional Conservative themes on foreign 
policy; particularly a support of the military. It may also be the case that Hurd’s own position 
evolved as he encountered more strongly pro-interventionism arguments among Britain’s 
partners in NATO. Major himself took the side of his Foreign Secretary, arguing that there 
were good reasons for sending British forces to Bosnia, principally to stop the slaughter and 
allow time for a solution to be reached between all sides (Major, 1999). However, in his 
memoirs, he reflects on how deeply divided the party was on the issue identifying four 
separate camps within the parliamentary party, each with a different view of the conflict 
(Major, 1999: 536). Wallace narrows the number down to three (Wallace, 1994) but the depth 
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of the divisions remained as visceral even if the number of Conservatives on the pro-
intervention side remained consistently fewer than on the opposition side (Rathburn, 2004). 
 
Perhaps the most consistent and prominent supporter of British intervention in Bosnia on the 
Conservative benches in the Commons was Sir Patrick Cormack. His arguments in favour of 
interventionism hinged on the central point of Conservative arguments against; the question 
of the British national interest. For Cormack, the war in Bosnia created the possibility of a 
wider conflict engulfing larger parts of Europe in similar strife if it was allowed to fester 
unchecked (Hansard, 1995c). He also made the case that it was in Britain’s interests to act in 
defence of the principles of both NATO and the United Nations; two institutions where 
Britain was a key player in both their founding and their on-going operation (Hansard, 
1994b). In other words, Britain’s national interest was tied to the international organisations 
and legal structures of which she was a part, and could not be separated from them. It was 
arguably the beginning of a distinctly Conservative case for humanitarian intervention and it 
was one that Major would himself side with in his memoirs, where he recalled his own 
concerns that a pan-Balkan war would seriously imperil the British interest, and so Britain 
had to commit herself heavily to Bosnia in order to avoid such an event (Major, 1999: 536). 
 
Bosnia saw the Conservative Party and government split deeply over a foreign policy issue - 
much as they already were over Europe - and the emergence of a coalition of moderate and 
right-wing Tory MPs, together with Labour left MPs such as Tony Benn, in opposition to the 
use of force in Bosnia. Whilst it saw some of the most recognisably Conservative 
articulations of reasons to oppose humanitarian intervention, it also saw the emergence, 
particularly through the Commons appearances of Sir Patrick Cormack, of the first signs of a 
distinctly Conservative argument in favour of humanitarian intervention; one that draws a 
much broader picture of the national interest and indeed expands it to include such issues as 
the maintenance of international law. 
  
Humanitarian Intervention in the Conservative-led Coalition: From Blair to Libya 
 
Humanitarian intervention arguably took a distinctly path-dependent step under New Labour. 
The established understanding of humanitarian intervention was reframed along the lines of 
what was politically possible for British foreign policy after the Cold War and what was 
morally necessary in a global community of states with a growing consensus of universal 
human rights.  It was on 22nd April 1999 that Tony Blair delivered a speech to the Economic 
Club in Chicago that became known as his ‘Chicago speech’ (Blair, 1999). In it he set out his 
moral and political view of humanitarian intervention in international affairs.  Blair’s foreign 
policy ventures are often viewed through the prism of the principles set out in this keynote 
speech but his thinking on the issue and the ‘Chicago speech’ itself was shaped by the first 
humanitarian intervention he was involved in as Prime Minister, namely, the Kosovo War of 
1998-1999 (Daddow, 2009) which was ongoing at the time of the speech and a means by 
which to garner international support for the intervention. Some scholars however, argue that 
with the invasion and subsequent war in Iraq in 2003, Blair’s foreign policy is more 
accurately explained as a form of neo-conservatism which was manifest in the foreign policy 
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of President George W. Bush (Dodds and Elden, 2008). Jason Ralph asserts that whilst 
Blair’s conception of the international community was politically flawed with regards to Iraq, 
it nonetheless reveals his moral thinking on humanitarian intervention, one that stands in 
contradistinction to realist assumptions (Ralph, 2011).  
 
The Conservative-led Coalition is managing the effects of Blair’s foreign policy and have had 
their approach to humanitarian intervention influenced by it (Beech, 2011b). This claim is 
supported by three data points: firstly, the Conservatives supported Blair’s humanitarian 
interventions in Kosovo (Blair, 2010) and Sierra Leone (Coll, 2010); secondly, Cameron and 
Hague have made speeches whilst in government endorsing the ‘ends’ of humanitarian 
intervention in a manner that Thatcher and Major did not (Cameron, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; 
Hague, 2011, 2012); and thirdly, when one compares the views of Cameron and Hague on 
humanitarian intervention with that of the previous generation of Conservative Foreign 
Secretaries interviewed on the topic, it reveals a philosophical divide. When asked the 
questions: 
1. What is your opinion of the doctrine of ‘liberal internationalism’4 espoused and 
demonstrated by the Labour governments of Tony Blair? 
2. Is ‘liberal internationalism’ an appropriate foreign policy doctrine? 
The four former Conservative Foreign Secretaries gave the following responses: 
Lord Carrington: I think you’ve got to be very, very careful.  It’s the nanny state again 
interfering in other people’s affairs. When I was mixed up in all that Yugoslavia 
thing, I thought that we’d made a mistake in what we did there trying to interfere with 
other people’s affairs without knowing...the Germans were in favour of the 
Croats...the French were pro-Serb and therefore you got in to a terrible state and you 
didn’t know who you were supporting and then you had this ridiculous business of 
NATO and the United Nations going in to keep the peace and told they could only fire 
their weapons in self-defence.  As a result you got Srebrenica.  I think you’ve got to 
be extraordinarily careful before you interfere in other people’s affairs.  And I’m not 
sure about Liberal internationalism it’s too much do-gooding. I don’t mind you saying 
it all, but to send soldiers in....Blair and others are passionate at interfering in 
everybody’s affairs and in our own affairs. I mean, they’ve really become intrusive in 
this country, in one’s own private what-not... life. I’m all against that. I’m not in 
favour of it. Carrington, P. (2010, 11 January) Interview with the author. 
Lord Howe: It’s hard to know how far it has done, whether it has been supportive of a 
neo-con militant campaign to secure the promotion of existing governments by so 
called democratic alternatives.  Or whether it’s reacting to much narrower and less 
politically driven problem therefore like Sierra Leone.  We’ll have to judge the 
reaction. MB: Would you say it is an appropriate foreign policy doctrine? It is a 
potentially misleading foreign policy doctrine. The essence of foreign policy is that 
                                                          
4 During the interviews the phrase ‘liberal internationalism’ was used instead of ‘humanitarian intervention’.  
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you have to judge so many questions by individualistic standards and tests. Howe, G. 
(2009, 14 December) Interview with the author. 
 
Lord Hurd: I think it is...provided the conditions are applied and the most important 
condition is, are you pretty sure that you are going to leave country X in a better state 
than you found it. If you can’t answer yes to that then you should keep away. Because 
the dangers are very great, we’ve seen that and the test of the outcome, the test of 
whether the result is a good one has to be quite rigorously applied. Hurd, D. (2009, 14 
December) Interview with the author. 
 
Sir Malcolm Rifkind: I think where we would however - and personally would -  
strongly draw the line, and I would argue that recent history gives added force to this 
is, that there is a massive difference between a diplomatic, political and social policy 
of encouraging human rights and freedom in other countries and in that sense liberal 
internationalism...and to put it bluntly, going to war and invading countries that are no 
threat to you because you believe that by doing that you will somehow create freedom 
for those countries... Rifkind, M. (2009, 23 November) Interview with the author. 
 
In their responses all four former Foreign Secretaries are critical of humanitarian intervention 
practiced by the Blair governments.  They consider this form of humanitarian intervention as 
a potentially dangerous path for British foreign policy.  It is here that one detects the innate 
scepticism of grand plans and idealist philosophical projects that realist Conservatives share. 
Lord Hurd comes closest to endorsing Blair’s gambit but his response suggests the need to be 
convinced that humanitarian intervention will be bring more good than remaining uninvolved 
(Hurd, D. (2009, 14 December) Interview with the author).  
 
This is a complex dilemma for liberal states because no single humanitarian intervention is 
the same. It makes drawing lessons from history useful but not a fool-proof means of 
preventing ramifications. Also, humanitarian intervention often leads to unpalatable 
externalities such as civilian deaths.  The quandary for liberal states seeking to uphold human 
rights and, protect where possible, the liberties of the vulnerable is that to do justice can result 
in actions some would deem morally unacceptable. The difference between those who 
believe that humanitarian intervention is a duty for a great power such as Britain and those 
who emphasise the sovereignty of nation-states, the business of national interest and the law 
of unintended consequences mirrors the conversation between idealists and realists in 
international relations theory. Cameron and Hague bridge this philosophical divide whereas 
their Tory predecessors remain firmly in the realist tradition.  The impact of Blair’s foreign 
policy idealism with its focus on humanitarian intervention has played its part in the 
recalibration of contemporary Conservative foreign policy and yet the case-study of the 
Libyan revolution of 2011 suggests that Cameron and Hague have proceeded with greater 
caution.5 
                                                          
5The Conservative-led Coalition’s attitudes and actions towards the conflict in Syria will require future 
evaluation to enable scholars to weigh all available data before making definitive judgements. Therefore, the 
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The Libyan Revolution 
 
The Libyan Revolution occurred in response to the forty-two year dictatorship of Colonel 
Gaddafi that mixed Marxism with Arab nationalism and whose statecraft can best be 
described as authoritarian.  Of critical import to the rebels opposing Gaddafi’s regime was the 
spate of civil protests beginning in Tunisia in December 2010 dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’.  The 
impact of the Tunisian public demonstrations resulted in President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
fleeing to Saudi Arabia in January 2011. Similar protests also in January 2011 centred on 
Tahir Square in Egypt in opposition to President Hosni Mubarak. After several weeks of 
sustained civil unrest and worldwide media attention political authority was passed to the 
Egyptian army and, in turn, they appointed Essam Sharaf as Prime Minister in March 2011.  
In addition, the nations of Yemen and Syria experienced civil protests against their respective 
regimes in early 2011 and a bloody civil war continues to wage in Syria.  
 
Approximately two months after the conflict in Libya had begun, UN Security Council 
Resolution 1973 was passed on 17th March which, amongst other things, mandated the 
protection of Libyan civilians and ‘…the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian 
assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel…’ (UNSC, 2011:1). Hague outlined 
Britain’s diplomatic role in the lead up to the resolution: 
 
It was a British-drafted Resolution that was adopted unanimously at the UN Security 
Council, referring Libya to the International Criminal Court and targeting the 
movement and assets of the regime; it was Britain and our allies who rightly gathered 
the sixteen signatures needed to trigger a Special Session of the UN Human Rights 
Council, paving the way for Libya to be suspended from the Council (Hague, 2011) 
 
Therefore, in the eyes of the Conservative-led Coalition the international community had 
agreed to come to the aid of the Libyan people to protect them from Gaddafi’s regime. On 
18th March Cameron gave a statement to the House of Commons pertaining to the UN 
resolution and in it he outlined his three-point criteria justifying humanitarian intervention in 
Libya: 
Mr Speaker, intervening in another country's affairs should not be undertaken save in 
quite exceptional circumstances. That is why we've always been clear that preparing 
for eventualities which might include the use of force - including a no fly zone or 
other measures to stop humanitarian catastrophe - would require three tests to be met. 
Demonstrable need. Regional Support. And a clear legal basis. (Cameron, 2011b) 
 
On 19th March Britain, in partnership with the United States and France, took the lead in a 
broader international coalition of states to protect Libyan civilians from Gaddafi’s forces in 
accordance with UN Resolution 1973 with NATO taking responsibility for the intervention 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conclusions in this section of the paper, because they relate solely to the Libyan intervention, must be seen as 
tentative and only part of an analysis of the Conservative-led Coalition’s approach to humanitarian intervention. 
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on 31st March. This was achieved over a period of seven months and entailed the 
enforcement of a no-fly zone, a naval blockade and air strikes on Libyan state assets. 
Britain’s contribution to the intervention involved 2,300 service personnel, 8 warships, a 
hunter-killer submarine, 36 aircraft, in excess of 3,000 air missions and 2,000 sortie strikes 
(Cameron, 2011c). NATO’s involvement reduced the military capacity and eroded the morale 
of the Libyan state forces. This in turn aided the rebel’s mission to take the Gaddafi 
strongholds of Tripoli and Sirte. On 20th October Gaddafi was killed by Libyan rebels during 
the Battle of Sirte and, with this, power effectively shifted to the National Transitional 
Council. Speaking of Britain’s role in the intervention to returning armed services personnel, 
Cameron said: ‘Gaddafi was hell-bent on going to Benghazi and murdering and massacring 
his own people and it was the action that NATO countries, that Britain, that France, that 
America took – that you took – that stopped that massacre taking place.’ (Cameron, 2011c). 
 
In diplomatic terms the decision making process which culminated in UN-sanctioned action 
against Libya was relatively swift but the role played by the Conservative-led Coalition was 
more cautious and tempered when compared to humanitarian interventions under Blair.  
Firstly, much of the Coalition’s caution was financially driven as their over-riding aim at the 
time was to clear Britain’s structural deficit and humanitarian intervention is very costly.  
Discussing the Coalition’s National Security Strategy (NSS) (Cabinet Office, 2010) and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) (HM Government: 2010), Christopher 
Martin points out: 
 
The NSS and SDSR are fundamentally financially driven. Whatever the Coalition’s 
claims, the SDSR is not a normal security review; it is an interim measure designed to 
meet current financial problems, (Martin, 2011: 190) 
 
Secondly, at the time of the intervention, Britain’s armed forces were over stretched with 
commitments in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, in Iraq (Wyatt, 2011). Thirdly, from the 
publication of its NSS the Conservative-led Coalition emphasised that Britain’s approach to 
humanitarian intervention would be marked by a step-change, as Rhiannon Vickers notes: 
 
One notable shift from the NSS of the previous Labour Government was that the 2010 
strategy focused on preventing rather than intervening in conflict, and appeared to 
herald the end of liberal interventionism so that if a Kosovo-type situation arose, the 
new government might take a different approach from Blair’s. (Vickers, 2011: 212) 
 
When taken together these three factors suggest that the Conservative-led Coalition’s 
involvement in the humanitarian intervention in Libya was more tempered in tone and 
emanated from both financial and foreign policy priorities which determined a smaller, 
cheaper and less ambitious armed forces. Therefore, one can sense that the Conservative-led 
Coalition desire on the one hand a more restrained global role for Britain which in their 
opinion suits the age of austerity and moves foreign policy on from the zeal of the Blair years 
and yet on the other hand, retains an element of idealism which continues to place Britain 
near the forefront of humanitarian intervention by the international community.  
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Conclusion: Cameronite Foreign Policy - The Rise of Solidarism? 
 
Cameron’s own personal response to questioning about the need for humanitarian 
interventionism from Dylan Jones reveals a critique that focuses more on the way such 
interventions were executed by the Labour government, rather than a specific attack on the 
idea of humanitarian interventionism itself (Jones, 2008: 263). This in itself represents a 
significant underlying shift in Conservative foreign policy since the days of the Thatcher and 
Major governments, when, as discussed above, much of the party rejected the very principle 
of humanitarian interventionism outright. Cameron is not alone in his thoughts on this; 
another prominent member of the Conservative Party, Michael Gove, has publically 
expressed his support for interventionism in other states on similar grounds (Gove, 2006). 
Perhaps most critically for Cameron and the Conservative Party, the Foreign Secretary 
William Hague has also become a firm advocate of humanitarian intervention on what can be 
described as solidarist grounds, as we have seen above in the case of Libya. His talk of 
needing to promote Britain’s ‘enlightened national interest’ (Hague, 2011), when seen in light 
of the evidence presented above, fits well with Cormack’s arguments at the time of Bosnia – 
Britain’s national interest is more than its own physical defence, but ties into the upholding of 
international laws and norms. 
 
Indeed, first as Shadow Foreign Secretary and then as Foreign Secretary, Hague has had the 
greatest opportunity of any senior Conservative politician to flesh out the party’s approach to 
foreign affairs. In a speech in the Netherlands in 2012, Hague spoke on the importance of 
international law, stating that: 
 
The rule of law is crucial to the preservation of the rights of individuals and the 
protection of the interests of all states. To borrow Erasmus’ words, justice “restrains 
bloodshed, punishes guilt, defends possessions and keeps people safe from 
oppression”. (Hague, 2012) 
 
This is an explicit argument that order in international affairs cannot be achieved without 
justice. Hague’s speech in the Netherlands draws together the rights of the individual – the 
cosmopolitan vision of mankind as a single unit – and the rights of states, more akin to the 
positivist vision. Hague’s argument hinges on the idea that, in a changed world where 
problems freely cross - or indeed do not recognise - borders there is a need to pursue justice 
across them in a more radical fashion. This is a classically solidarist account of how the 
world should operate; that order and justice must be seen on a parity with each other and one 
cannot be achieved without the other. Indeed, Hague pushes even further in this speech, 
arguing, ‘The idea of sovereignty as a barricade against international justice has been all but 
eradicated.’ (Hague, 2012) Thus, the attempt to draw together and balance the two rights 
gives way, in places, to a more completely solidarist, or even cosmopolitan account of 
international affairs. No longer can those who perpetrate injustice expect to hide behind the 
shield of sovereignty; when their actions threaten justice as well as order, the international 
society can reach in to that state and respond. Whilst Hague is talking more of international 
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criminal law than the use of force in this section, the language can, it is argued, be readily 
appropriated for that cause.   
 
But that is not to say that this generation of Conservative leaders has completely abandoned 
traditional Conservative foreign policy perspectives, of the sort identified by  
Keohane (Keohane, 2003). Arguably, Cameron’s critique of the New Labour humanitarian 
interventions has much to do with these traditional approaches that focus on defence, the 
British national interest and a more realist conception of international politics (Keohane, 
2003). Whilst he does favour intervening in states for humanitarian reasons, Cameron still 
criticises New Labour for a failure to use the military instrument properly and cautiously; he 
still identifies his foreign policy with Conservative themes on defence (Jones, 2008: 263), 
even if those themes now serve as a case-by-case critique, rather than a buttress to a more 
fundamental argument against idealism in the form of humanitarian intervention. Honeyman 
directly identifies this trend within Conservative foreign policy; writing while the party was 
still in opposition, she notes that their focus was on mistakes made, rather than a fundamental 
critique of the Labour governments’ foreign policy (Honeyman, 2009: 185-186).  
 
The Conservative-led Coalition have retained a commitment to realist foreign policy themes, 
but it is clear from Conservative support of Blair’s humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and 
Sierra Leone; speeches in government by Cameron and Hague; the divergence of opinion 
between Cameron and Hague and previous Conservative Foreign Secretaries over 
humanitarian intervention; and, most notably, the Conservative-led Coalition’s involvement 
in the Libyan revolution that a solidarist idealist ethic has been incorporated into their foreign 
policy thinking. 
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